University of Chicago Press

Analysis of social networks is suggested as a tool for linking micro and macro levels of sociological theory. The procedure is illustrated by elaboration of the macro implications of one aspect of small-scale interaction: the strength of dyadic ties. It is argued that the degree of overlap of two individuals' friendship networks varies directly with the strength of their tie to one another. The impact of this principle on diffusion of influence and information, mobility opportunity, and community organization is explored. Stress is laid on the cohesive power of weak ties. Most network models deal, implicitly, with strong ties, thus confining their applicability to small, well-defined groups. Emphasis on weak ties lends itself to discussion of relations between groups and to analysis of segments of social structure not easily defined in terms of primary groups.

If options are correctly priced in the market, it should not be possible to make sure profits by creating portfolios of long and short positions in options and their underlying stocks. Using this principle, a theoretical valuation formula for options is derived. Since almost all corporate liabilities can be viewed as combinations of options, the formula and the analysis that led to it are also applicable to corporate liabilities such as common stock, corporate bonds, and warrants. In particular, the formula can be used to derive the discount that should be applied to a corporate bond because of the possibility of default.

How behavior and institutions are affected by social relations is one of the classic questions of social theory. This paper concerns the extent to which economic action is embedded in structures of social relations, in modern industrial society. Although the usual neoclasical accounts provide an undersocialized or atomized-actor explanation of such action, reformist economists who attempt to bring social structure back in do so in the way criticized by Dennis Wrong. Under-and oversocialized accounts are paradoxically similar in their neglect of ongoing structures of social relations, and a sophisticated account of economic action must consider its embeddedness in such structures. The argument in illustrated by a critique of Oliver Williamson's markets and hierarchies research program.

Many formal organizational structures arise as reflections of rationalized institutional rules. The elaboration of such rules in modern states and societies accounts in part for the expansion and increased complexity of formal organizational structures. Institutional rules function as myths which organizations incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival prospects. Organizations whose structures become isomorphic with the myths of the institutional environment-in contrast with those primarily structured by the demands of technical production and exchange-decrease internal coordination and control in order to maintain legitimacy. Structures are decoupled from each other and from ongoing activities. In place of coordination, inspection, and evaluation, a logic of confidence and good faith is employed.

There are two broad intellectual streams in the description and explanation of social action. One, characteristic of the work of most sociologists, sees the actor as socialized and action as governed by social norms, rules, and obligations. The principal virtues of this intellectual stream lie in its ability to describe action in social context and to explain the way action is shaped, constrained, and redirected by the social context. The other intellectual stream, characteristic of the work of most economists, sees the actor as having goals independently arrived at, as acting independently, and as wholly self-interested. Its principal virtue lies in having a principle of action, that of maximizing utility. This principle of action, together with a single empirical generalization (declining marginal utility), has generated the extensive growth of neoclassical economic theory, as well as the growth of political philosophy of several varieties: utilitarianism, contractarianism, and natural rights. In earlier works (Coleman 1986a, 1986b), I have argued for and engaged in the development of a theoretical orientation in sociology that includes components from both these intellectual streams. It accepts the principle of rational or purposive action and attempts to show how that principle, in conjunction with particular social contexts, can account not only for the actions of individuals in particular contexts but also for the development of social organization. In the present paper, I introduce a conceptual tool for use in this theoretical enterprise: social capital. As background for introducing this concept, it is useful to see some of the criticisms of and attempts to modify the two intellectual streams. Both these intellectual streams have serious defects. The sociological stream has what may be a fatal flaw as a theoretical enterprise: the actor has no “engine of action.” The actor is shaped by the environment, but there are no internal springs of action that give the actor a purpose or direction. The very conception of action as wholly a product of the environment has led sociologists themselves to criticize this intellectual stream, as in Dennis Wrong’s (1961) “Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology.”

1. Make a list of some of the metaphors discussed by Lakoff and Johnson. Try inserting new words that convey a different meaning. For example, consider the expression, “I’d like to share some time with you ” rather than “spend some time with you.” 2. Make a list of “language asymmetries ” (see Part II, p. XX, and Reading 12 for definitions) and consider what underlying cultural values these asymmetries indicate. 3. Consider the use of the masculine he or man to refer to all people. Some people say that this “generic use ” is perfectly acceptable because the terms “imply ” women as well as men. Others argue that the term not only leaves out half the population but also perpetuates an image of women as “auxiliary”and men as “central.”Discuss this. 4. Discuss the cultural practice of women taking men’s names when they marry. What cultural values does this practice convey? 5. Keep track of all the “medicalized ” terms you hear for a few days (for example, erectile dysfunction, hyperkinesis). Try substituting more common terms and see if you think about the “problem ” differently. For example, clinically depressed versus tired and really burnt out. Do these problems seem more real or authentic with the use of some terms rather than others?

This paper presents a fully specified model of long-run growth in which knowledge is assumed to be an input in production that has increasing marginal productivity.It is essentially a competitive equilibrium model with endogenous technological change.In contrast to models based on diminishing returns, growth rates can be increasing over time, the effects of small disturbances can be amplified by the actions of private agents, and large countries may always grow faster than small countries.Long-run evidence is offered in support of the empirical relevance of these possibilities. This paper is based on work from my dissertation (Romer 1983). An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title "Externalities and Increasing Returns in Dynamic Competitive Analysis.' At various stages I have benefited from comments by James J.

This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common‐law countries generally have the strongest, and frenchcivillaw countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German‐and scandinavin‐civil‐law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negativelyrelated to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified share‐holders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.

Growth in this model is driven by technological change that arises from intentional investment decisions made by profit-maximizing agents. The distinguishing feature of the technology as an input is that it is neither a conventional good nor a public good; it is a nonrival, partially excludable good. Because of the nonconvexity introduced by a nonrival good, price-taking competition cannot be supported. Instead, the equilibrium is one with monopolistic competition. The main conclusions are that the stock of human capital determines the rate of growth, that too little human capital is devoted to research in equilibrium, that integration into world markets will increase growth rates, and that having a large population is not sufficient to generate growth.

When parents live apart, typically one parent may claim the child for tax credit purposes. We estimate the impact of alternative policy options, allowing either parent’s earnings or joint earnings to be used to claim the earned income tax credit (EITC) and the child tax credit (CTC). When either parent’s earnings may be used, the estimated share of families qualifying for the EITC grows from 53.9 to 73.8 percent; among parents with earnings below the poverty level, 28.9 percent newly qualify. CTC participation rises 14.7 percentage points; among poor families, participation rises 32.9 percentage points, substantially increasing the anti-poverty impact for single-parent families.

The federal income tax does not explicitly discriminate by race or ethnicity but can still generate disparate outcomes when a group’s activity correlates with determinants of tax liability. Using Survey of Consumer Finances data and NBER’s TAXSIM model, we find that untaxed forms of income accrue disproportionately to white households across most income levels. Black and Hispanic households face lower tax rates than whites in low-income groups due to differences in filing status and dependents, but Black units face higher rates than whites in high-income groups due to differences in income composition. We also examine cross-group implications of historical and prospective policy changes.

Abstract This article introduces a dual-corpus database on the Turkish Constitutional Court spanning 1962–2025: 5,513 norm review and 16,626 individual application decisions, with claim-level outcomes, full texts, validated classifications, and a companion dataset of 138 justices. It fills a gap in replicable infrastructure on a court prominent in the comparative literature on judicial politics and democratic backsliding. The data make judicial disagreement and avoidance measurable at population scale: procedural rejections, a gate-keeping category excluded from prior quantitative work, constitute 20% of norm review decisions, and dissent rates range from 6% in the Court’s sections to 47% in plenary.