Controller Cyber-Attack Detection and Isolation
Anna Sztybera✉, Michał Syferta, Jan Maciej Kościelnya, Zuzanna Góreckaa
- aFaculty of Mechatronics, Warsaw University of Technology, 00-661 Warsaw, Poland
- ✉Corresponding author
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Abstract
This article deals with the cyber security of industrial control systems. Methods for detecting and isolating process faults and cyber-attacks, consisting of elementary actions named "cybernetic faults" that penetrate the control system and destructively affect its operation, are analysed. FDI fault detection and isolation methods and the assessment of control loop performance methods developed in the automation community are used to diagnose these anomalies. An integration of both approaches is proposed, which consists of checking the correct functioning of the control algorithm based on its model and tracking changes in the values of selected control loop performance indicators to supervise the control circuit. A binary diagnostic matrix was used to isolate anomalies. The presented approach requires only standard operating data (process variable (PV), setpoint (SP), and control signal (CV). The proposed concept was tested using the example of a control system for superheaters in a steam line of a power unit boiler. Cyber-attacks targeting other parts of the process were also included in the study to test the proposed approach's applicability, effectiveness, and limitations and identify further research directions.
TL;DRMethods for detecting and isolating process faults and cyber-attacks, consisting of elementary actions named “cybernetic faults” that penetrate the control system and destructively affect its operation, are analysed. (Semantic Scholar)

