Going Native: Using a Large-Scale Analysis of Android Apps to Create a Practical Native-Code Sandboxing Policy
Vitor Monte Afonsoa, Antonio Bianchib, Yanick Fratantoniob, Adam Doupéc, Mario Polinod, Paulo Lício de Geuse, Christopher Kruegelb, Giovanni Vignab
- aCAPES Foundation
- bUC Santa
- cArizona State University
- dPolitecnico di Milano
- eUniversity of Campinas
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Abstract
Current static analysis techniques for Android applications operate at the Java level-that is, they analyze either the Java source code or the Dalvik bytecode.However, Android allows developers to write code in C or C++ that is cross-compiled to multiple binary architectures.Furthermore, the Java-written components and the native code components (C or C++) can interact.Native code can access all of the Android APIs that the Java code can access, as well as alter the Dalvik Virtual Machine, thus rendering static analysis techniques for Java unsound or misleading.In addition, malicious apps frequently hide their malicious functionality in native code or use native code to launch kernel exploits.It is because of these security concerns that previous research has proposed native code sandboxing, as well as mechanisms to enforce security policies in the sandbox.However, it is not clear whether the large-scale adoption of these mechanisms is practical: is it possible to define a meaningful security policy that can be imposed by a native code sandbox without breaking app functionality?In this paper, we perform an extensive analysis of the native code usage in 1.2 million Android apps.We first used static analysis to identify a set of 446k apps potentially using native code, and we then analyzed this set using dynamic analysis.This analysis demonstrates that sandboxing native code with no permissions is not ideal, as apps' native code components perform activities that require Android permissions.However, our analysis provided very encouraging insights that make us believe that sandboxing native code can be feasible and useful in practice.In fact, it was possible to automatically generate a native code sandboxing policy, which is derived from our analysis, that limits many malicious behaviors while still allowing the correct execution of the behavior witnessed during dynamic analysis for 99.77% of the benign apps in our dataset.The usage of our system to generate policies would reduce the attack surface available to native code and, as a further benefit, it would also enable more reliable static analysis of Java code.
TL;DRAn extensive analysis of the native code usage in 1.2 million Android apps demonstrates that sandboxing native code with no permissions is not ideal, as apps’ native code components perform activities that require Android permissions, and provides very encouraging insights that make us believe that sandboxed native code can be feasible and useful in practice. (Semantic Scholar)