SPOKE
Ruowen Wanga, Ahmed M. Azaba, William Enckb, Ninghui Lic, Peng Ninga, Xun Chena, Wenbo Shena, Yueqiang Chenga
- aSamsung Research America, Mountain View, CA, USA
- bNorth Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA
- cPurdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
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Abstract
SEAndroid is a mandatory access control (MAC) framework that can confine faulty applications on Android. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of SEAndroid enforcement depends on the employed policy. The growing complexity of Android makes it difficult for policy engineers to have complete domain knowledge on every system functionality. As a result, policy engineers sometimes craft over-permissive and ineffective policy rules, which unfortunately increased the attack surface of the Android system and have allowed multiple real-world privilege escalation attacks. We propose SPOKE, an SEAndroid Policy Knowledge Engine, that systematically extracts domain knowledge from rich-semantic functional tests and further uses the knowledge for characterizing the attack surface of SEAndroid policy rules. Our attack surface analysis is achieved by two steps: 1) It reveals policy rules that cannot be justified by the collected domain knowledge. 2) It identifies potentially over-permissive access patterns allowed by those unjustified rules as the attack surface.
TL;DRSPOKE is proposed, an SEAndroid Policy Knowledge Engine that systematically extracts domain knowledge from rich-semantic functional tests and further uses the knowledge for characterizing the attack surface of SEAndroid policy rules. (Semantic Scholar)