Theory of mind tested by implicit false belief: a simple and full‐fledged mental state attribution
Jun Egawaa b, Keisuke Kawasakic d, Taketsugu Hayashia b, Ryota Akikawac d, Toshiyuki Someyaa b✉, Isao Hasegawac d✉
- aDepartment of Psychiatry Niigata University Graduate School of Medical and Dental Sciences Japan
- bDepartment of Psychiatry, Niigata University Graduate School of Medical and Dental Sciences, Japan
- cDepartment of Physiology Niigata University School of Medicine Japan
- dDepartment of Physiology, Niigata University School of Medicine, Japan
- ✉Corresponding author
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Abstract
About 40 years have passed since 'theory of mind (ToM)' research started. The false-belief test is used as a litmus test for ToM ability. The implicit false-belief test has renewed views of ToM in several disciplines, including psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience. Many important questions have been considered via the paradigm of implicit false belief. We recently addressed the phylogenetic and physiological aspects of ToM using a version of this paradigm combined with the chemogenetic technique on Old World monkeys. We sought to create animal models for autism that exhibit behavioral phenotypes similar to human symptoms. The simultaneous manipulation of neural circuits and assessments of changes in phenotypes can help identify the causal neural substrate of ToM.