SOCCA: A Security-Oriented Cyber-Physical Contingency Analysis in Power Infrastructures
Saman Zonouza b, Charles M. Davisc d, Katherine Davisc d, Robin Berthiere f, Rakesh B. Bobbae f, William H. Sanderse f
- aElectrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of Miami, Miami, FL, USA
- bElectr. & Comput. Eng. Dept., Univ. of Miami, Miami, FL, USA
- cPowerWorld Corporation, Champaign, IL, USA
- dPowerWorld Corp., Champaign, IL, USA
- eElectrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA
- f[Electr. & Comput. Eng. Dept., Univ. of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA]
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Abstract
Contingency analysis is a critical activity in the context of the power infrastructure because it provides a guide for resiliency and enables the grid to continue operating even in the case of failure. In this paper, we augment this concept by introducing SOCCA, a cyber-physical security evaluation technique to plan not only for accidental contingencies but also for malicious compromises. SOCCA presents a new unified formalism to model the cyber-physical system including interconnections among cyber and physical components. The cyber-physical contingency ranking technique employed by SOCCA assesses the potential impacts of events. Contingencies are ranked according to their impact as well as attack complexity. The results are valuable in both cyber and physical domains. From a physical perspective, SOCCA scores power system contingencies based on cyber network configuration, whereas from a cyber perspective, control network vulnerabilities are ranked according to the underlying power system topology.