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Incentive Compatible Mulit-Unit Combinatorial Auctions: A Primal Dual Approach
Niv Buchbindera b, Rica Gonenc d✉
- aStatistics and Operations Research Dept., Tel Aviv University, P.O. Box 39040, Tel Aviv, 6997801, Israel
- bStatistics and Operations Research Dept., Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel 6997801#TAB#
- cDept. of Management and Economics, The Open University of Israel, The Dorothy de Rothschild Campus, 1 University Road, Raanana, 4353701, Israel
- dDept. of Management and Economics, The Open University of Israel, Raanana, Israel 4353701#TAB#
- ✉Corresponding author
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