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Agency Problems in Banking: Types of and Incentives for Risk Shifting · SciRah

book chapter

Agency Problems in Banking: Types of and Incentives for Risk Shifting

Miguel A. Durán^a✉, Ana Lozano‐Vivas^a

^aUniversity of Malaga, Malaga, Spain
✉Corresponding author

Contributions to economics Springer International Publishing2015-07-29 0 citations24 references

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Contributions to economics →

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Topics

Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Corporate Finance and Governance finance, banking, and market dynamics

Identifiers

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-17413-6_4
OpenAlex: W2285335217

Metadata from OpenAlex, Crossref.