conference paper
Can Industrial Intrusion Detection Be SIMPLE?
Konrad Wolsinga b✉, Lea Thiemta, Christian van Slouna, Eric Wagnera b, Klaus Wehrlea, Martin Henzeb c
- aCommunication and Distributed Systems, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany
- bCyber Analysis and Defense, Fraunhofer FKIE, Bonn, Germany
- cSecurity and Privacy in Industrial Cooperation, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany
- ✉Corresponding author
Lecture notes in computer scienceSpringer Science+Business Media2022-01-01 20 citations73 references
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TL;DRThe design of four SIMPLE industrial intrusion detection systems are proposed, such as simple tests for the minima and maxima of process values or the rate at which process values change, which reveal that SIMPLE approaches can perform on par with existing complex approaches from related work while simultaneously being comprehensible and easily portable to other scenarios. (Semantic Scholar)